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Beevor’s scrutiny. The Americans, fixated on securing a port facility for logistical support, learned the hard way that
the entrenched German garrison in
Brest could hold out for a very long
time. Despite a highly sophisticated
air-ground coordination and the commitment of VIII Corps, the Americans
had to pay dearly to pry Brest from resolute and determined German defenders
—blood spilled for a port that in the end
was never used.
Beevor is a well known historian of
twentieth-century combat, one who
knows his topic, capably weaves the
broad sweep of the Normandy campaign into a compelling account, and
provides the broader context, bringing
in aspects of the battle that until recently have received short shrift. For example, he presents an excellent account
of the battles fought by the Polish 1st
Armored Division. Also, he shows the
critical role of the 20 July assassination
attempt against Hitler in how the German leadership responded to the relentless Allied onslaught. The subsequent
hunt for conspirators wreaked havoc
with the German military’s ability to
wage a cohesive and effective defense
and helped set up the eventual Allied
breakout and defeat of the Wehrmacht
in France by the end of the summer.
Without a doubt, the battle for France
in 1944 saw some of the most ferocious
and savage fighting to take place in the
European theater. There was the unrelenting fight by Montgomery to take
Caen, which was won at great cost—
Allied bombing during Operation
GOODWOOD ultimately reduced the
town to rubble. Seeing Caen as pivotal
to the security of the beachhead, D-Day
planners expected to have it in Allied
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hands by the end of 6 June, but it did
not fall until mid-July. Beevor makes
the case that British sluggishness allowed a vast portion of the German
army to escape the Falaise Pocket—
German soldiers who would live to
fight the Allies another day.
A constant thread throughout his book
is the high cost paid by French citizens
for the liberation of their land. Nearly
twenty thousand French civilians died
during the liberation of Normandy, in
addition to the estimated fifteen thousand killed and nineteen thousand injured during the preliminary bombing.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE

San Diego, California
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Two decades ago scholars, government
policy makers, and military cold warriors struggled to decipher the meaning
of the sudden and drastic change happening in the Soviet bloc. Francis
Fukuyama now offers a provocative approach to this puzzle, which has been
widely debated and perhaps misunderstood ever since. He cautiously asked in
The End of History and the Last Man
(1992) “whether, at the end of the
twentieth century, it makes sense for us
once again to speak of a coherent and
directional History of mankind that will
eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy.” Fukuyama
went on to theorize that the fall of
communism represented a great step
forward in mankind’s struggle for
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“recognition” and higher standards of
government legitimacy. Fingers quickly
pointed to continual conflicts in Africa
and the Middle East as proof that such
idealistic notions had little value. Released in the midst of the Arab Spring,
however, this new book, the first of two
volumes analyzing the origins of political order, offers a timely presentation
of Fukuyama’s ideas on political
development.
It is a work of comparative political
philosophy wrapped around a politicalmilitary world history, from prehistory
through the eve of the French and
American Revolutions. As these events
marked the beginning of a rapid increase in the speed of political development, Fukuyama pauses here until the
second volume. He begins with a biological and anthropological premise
that humans naturally form societal
relationships based on kinship. Kinshipbased societal rule has, in turn, provided a barrier to three key areas of political development: the state, rule of
law, and accountable government. The
struggle to move from patrimonial systems of government to modern liberal
democracy is the framework for
Fukuyama’s history. Liberal development, as Fukuyama describes it, follows
many different paths in different regions and cultures, not a single, linear
progression.
Readers may be surprised by a nearly
complete absence of Greek and Roman
political history. Instead, the author describes paradoxes in Chinese, Indian,
and Ottoman development. Each of
these regions experienced bureaucratic
“state building,” with the potential to
escape the bonds of kinship-based rule,
but each ultimately underwent
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“political decay,” preventing the transition to liberal democracy. He contrasts
these with European political development, which, while unique, was not
predestined to occur before that of the
rest of the world.
Perhaps the most interesting features of
this work revolve around early achievements in state building that failed to secure lasting holds on their respective
societies. He describes, for example,
how though the Chinese dynasties of
Qin (221–207 BC) and Han (206 BC to
AD 220) embraced a centralized state,
meritocratic promotion, and an effective civilian-led military, the rule of law
never emerged and accountability remained subject to dynastic interpretation. In India, the Brahmans used
religion to create something akin to the
rule of law as well as an impartial standard of accountability for rulers, but
they were unable to form lasting state
institutions to enforce these trends.
As the American demand for the military to add “state building” to its list of
core competencies increases, officers
will find Fukuyama’s observations on
political origins valuable reminders of
the lasting effects of patrimonialism in
current conflict areas. While we ponder
the next phase of political development
from Tunisia to Bahrain to Afghanistan
and hope for the emergence of liberal
democracy, we should heed Fukuyama’s
caution, “Tribalism in its various forms
remains a default form of political organization, even after a modern state has
been created.” Perhaps this also explains
the lasting problem of interservice rivalry as well!
MAJ. MATT VAN HOOK, U.S. AIR FORCE

Air Force Academy
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